China’s Antimonopoly Law 2008: An Overview by Allan Fels
Rev Ind Organ (2012) 41:7–30
DOI 10.1007/s11151-012-9343-y
China’s Antimonopoly Law 2008: An Overview
Allan Fels
Received: 27 October 2011 / Accepted: 10 February 2012 / Published online: 2 March 2012
© The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This article outlines the economic, legal, and political background, gen-
eral features, main provisions, and enforcement mechanisms of China’s Antimonopoly
Law 2008 and describes some early developments in its application.
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1 Introduction
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was adopted on 30 August 2007 and came into
effect on 1 August 2008. Its introduction was an inevitable consequence of China’s
decision in the late 1970s to adopt a policy of reform and opening up of the econ-
omy internationally, and in 1993 to take further critical steps towards implementing a
“socialist market economy” philosophy. China, like most other countries, recognised
that once the market is acknowledged as being the main means by which goods and
services are delivered to the community, governments have to ensure that the market
works well and this above all requires the market to be competitive or at least not to
be hindered by unwarranted anticompetitive structures and behaviour.
Following some piecemeal steps towards the introduction of competition policy in
the 1980s, work on a modern comprehensive competition law commenced in 1994.
Then followed a lengthy process of drafting, debate, and very extensive and often
fruitful consultation internationally as well as within China. The outcome is a law
that broadly resembles best practice competition law of other countries, although the
law also has considerable scope for alternative interpretations and as the Chinese
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themselves affirm, “Chinese characteristics”, which are adaptations stated to be suit-
able to China’s stage of development and socialist market economy policies.
This article outlines the political and economic background of the AML, the history
of China’s competition law prior to 2007, the main rules of the AML, the administration
and enforcement arrangements, and some early developments. The article particularly
focuses on three issues: (1) the “Chinese characteristics” of the law; (2) the special
treatment of the problem of “administrative monopoly”; and (3) the challenges of
administering and enforcing the new law in a country with such a large population and
a distinctive economic, legal, and political system. The article concludes by identifying
current issues and challenges.
2 Economic and Political Background
From 1949 to 1978 central planning in China largely suppressed the role of the mar-
ket and of competition (Naughton 2007). The role of the law as a means of settling
commercial disputes was also weakened. Since 1978, however, there have been three
broad developments that are especially relevant to competition law and policy:
The first has been a transformation away from central planning—essentially
discarded after 1978—and in the direction of a market economy, albeit with a substan-
tial continuing government role. China terms itself as a “socialist market economy”,
a term that has many connotations but implies, inter alia, a commitment to a market-
driven, open economy but with a significant degree of state planning and intervention
and a substantial role for state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
In 2006, the State Council affirmed a core role for SOEs, stating that the “State
should solely own, or have a majority share in, enterprises engaged in power gen-
eration and distribution, all petrochemicals and natural gas, telecom and armaments.
The State should also have a controlling stake in the coal, aviation and shipping indus-
tries...Central SOEs should also become heavyweights in sectors including machinery,
automobiles, IT, construction, iron and steel and non-precious metals.”1
In addition, there is state dominance in banking, insurance, much of the rest of
finance, media, tobacco, and railways.
The second development has been the dramatic transformation from being an eco-
nomically backward, agricultural-based economy to a modern economy with a strong
industrial base, a much higher level of average income than was true 30 years ago, and
a considerable exposure to the world economy through trade and investment as well
as through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession in 2001.
The third has been a gradual trend not only to the restoration of a role for the law as
an instrument for resolving commercial disputes but also to the adoption of Western
(especially European) commercial law approaches both in terms of substance and
process. This trend, however, has far to go before it could be equated with Western
practices. Moreover, the adoption of the role of law is not to be equated with the
1 See Questions and Answers regarding China’s SOEs at http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/Q&A/
161765.htm; also see the National Bureau of Statistics of China, Communiqué on Major Data of the
Second National Economic Census (No. 1), at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/
t20091225_402610168.htm.
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adoption of the rule of law, with its like treatment of like persons, irrespective of their
status or relationships. There is also a considerable way to go in this dimension if
Western standards are to be achieved (Peerenboom 2002).
Besides these developments there are a number of significant continuing features
of the economic and political environment that bear on competition law. First, there
is much official and public concern about any potential foreign dominance of Chi-
nese business and a strong desire to build up Chinese business, including “national
champions”, that can participate in Chinese and global markets. There is also, how-
ever, a desire to benefit from technology transfer from foreign to Chinese interests; to
gain access to foreign markets; to learn about competition law from foreign countries;
and to benefit from cooperation from other competition law enforcement agencies in
appropriate cases (Huang 2008, 122–123).
Second, there are conventional debates about the role of competition law and policy
in the economy. These debates are not dissimilar to those in developed and develop-
ing economies about underlying policy objectives, core characteristics and processes,
administration and enforcement, and the relationship of competition policy to other
policies, such as industrial policies (Wang 2009, pp. 584–587).
Third, the coexistence of a system of economic reform and modernisation with a
non-democratic party-led socialist economy system establishes a somewhat different
political or “authorising” environment within which competition law and policy works
(Huang 2008, pp. 118–119). And fourth, with 1.3 billion people and the substantial
geographic spread of the population, China’s governance, administration, and enforce-
ment present large challenges for competition law.
3 Development of Competition Law Prior to 2007
Many laws and regulations with competition elements were enacted after 1978. They
were not comprehensive, but piecemeal. Importantly, many remain in force notwith-
standing the AML and hence need review. China’s first regulation about competi-
tion, issued by the State Council in October 1980, was the Interim Provisions for the
Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy, widely referred
to as the “Ten Articles on Competition”. They stressed the importance of eliminat-
ing regional blockades and department divisions, ordering that no region or depart-
ment may blockade the market or prohibit the sale of commodities originating in
other regions or departments. However, they relied on the regions and departments
themselves to implement these principles, with seemingly limited effect (Wang 2002,
pp. 216–217).
The Circular on the Prevention of Regional Market Blockades was issued in Novem-
ber 1990. Thus the question of regional restrictions on competition, trade and invest-
ment—often termed as “administrative monopoly”—was recognised from the start of
the reform period as very important, probably even more important than other compe-
tition questions. It remains critical and is addressed in the AML, as discussed below
(Wang 2002, pp. 221).
Formal competition legislation began in the late 1980s. The first general law that
related to competition was the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL), which was
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adopted in 1993.2 The AUCL prohibits unfair trading practices, including passing off,
commercial bribery, misleading advertising, commercial secrets infringement, illegal
prize-attached sales, and defamation, and certain types of anticompetitive behaviour,
including designated transactions by public utilities, administrative monopoly, below-
cost sales, tying, and bid rigging.3
The AUCL addresses abusive behaviour by utilities. It prohibits public utilities and
statutory monopolies from imposing certain restrictive transactions on their customers
(AUCL, Art. 6). These prohibitions concern telecoms, electric power, and water and
gas suppliers that supply services only if customers buy designated telephones, distri-
bution boxes, meters or heaters (Wen 2008, pp. 165–166). The AUCL also prohibits
sales below cost and tying (AUCL, Arts. 11 and 12). These prohibitions, however, do
not depend on showing that the firm has a dominant position. The AUCL prohibition
on sales below cost is not a per se rule as it contains a requirement of intent to eliminate
competitors, and it provides for exceptions (AUCL, Art. 11).4
The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and its local admin-
istration for industry and commerce branches (AICs) above the county level are the
primary enforcement agencies of the AUCL (AUCL, Art. 3).5 Enforcement is mainly
entrusted to the AICs, and they are principally active in cases about passing off, mis-
leading advertising, and commercial bribery.
In 1997, the Price Law was adopted mainly as a price control law for key com-
modities and services, but it also prohibits certain “unfair price activities”, including
collusion to control price, below-cost sales, discriminatory pricing, and seeking exor-
bitant profits.6 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which
enforces the Price Law, issued the Interim Provisions on Preventing Price Monopoly
in 2003 to elaborate its prohibitions and made some progress towards putting them into
a competition policy framework by linking them to the existence of dominance. These
regulations provided that a firm may not rely on its “market predominant position” to
engage in exploitative, predatory or discriminatory conduct.7
2 The AUCL was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) on
2 September 1993 and effective on 1 December 1993, English translation available at http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383803.htm.
3 See AUCL, Arts. 5, 8–10, 13–14 on unfair trading practices and Arts. 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15 on anti-
competitive behaviour.
4 The exceptions include the sales of fresh goods, seasonal goods, goods nearing expiry, or other over-
stocked goods at reduced prices or the sales of goods at reduced prices due to debt repayment, switch in
production, or close of business.
5 However, it should be noted that Article 3 has caused potential inter-agency conflicts between the SAIC
and other administrative bodies because it further provides that where laws or administrative regulations
stipulate that other departments shall exercise the supervision and inspection of unfair competitive behav-
iour, those provisions shall apply.
6 See Price Law, Art. 14. The Price Law was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the NPC on 29
December 1997 and effective on 1 May 1998, English translation available at www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/
Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=50956.
7 The Interim Provisions on Preventing Price Monopoly were repealed on 1 February 2011 alongside the
entry into force of the NDRC’s Measures on the Prohibition of Price Monopoly, which accompany the
AML. See the discussion in Sect. 7.1 below.
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The Provisions on the Prohibition of Below-Cost Sales, which was issued in 1999,
expanded the notion of what is considered to be a sale “below cost” under the Price
Law. The term “cost” refers to the cost of production and operation. This probably
implies a test based on variable cost, although average cost and the scope of the price
cut may be relevant if variable cost cannot be determined. The provision applies if
there is intent to eliminate competitors or monopolise the market; pricing below cost is
permitted for such reasons as clearance sales.8 The Administrative Measures for Fair
Transactions between Retailers and Suppliers (hereinafter “Retailers and Suppliers
Measures”), which was issued in 2006, prohibits agreements requiring resale price
maintenance directly sold by suppliers to consumers and other operators, tie-in sales,
or exclusive dealing. The Retailers and Suppliers Measures also cover other common
topics of dispute in distribution relationships, such as timely payments, returns, and
promotional support.9
In 2003, a merger-control regime was introduced as part of the Interim Provisions
on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the M&A
Rules). The M&A Rules provided a basic regulatory framework for mergers and acqui-
sitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors and included provisions that relate
to competition issues that are raised by such transactions.10
Three bodies—the SAIC, the NDRC, and the Ministry of Commerce (MOF-
COM)—have been principally responsible for enforcing these competition-related
laws and regulations. However, the three agencies and their corresponding local
bureaus have shared enforcement powers, and the situation has seemingly caused
some lack of coherence in enforcement activities.
4 The Overlap Between the AML and other Competition Provisions
The AML does not explicitly repeal and therefore coexists with many competition
provisions that exist in other laws and regulations. Based on the general principles
of hierarchy of Chinese laws, the AML as the more recent economy-wide legisla-
tion should take precedence over previous laws and regulations in cases of conflict.11
However, to the extent that it does not contradict the AML, prior legislation may apply
concurrently with the AML.
The overlap between the AML and prior laws and regulations has caused uncer-
tainty because similar conduct may incur different sanctions pursuant to different laws
and regulations. Furthermore, conduct that does not infringe the AML may infringe
other laws. For example, under the AML, a member of a price cartel or a dominant
8 The Provisions on the Prohibition of Below-Cost Dumping Conduct were promulgated by the former
National Development and Planning Commission on 3 August 1999 and effective on the same day, official
Chinese text available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/zcfbl2003pro/t20050707_27844.htm.
9 The Retailers and Suppliers Measures were promulgated on 12 October 2006 and effective on
15 November 2006, English translation available at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/
law_en_info.jsp?docid=74959.
10 The M&A Rules were issued on 7 March 2003 and effective on 12 April 2003, English translation avail-
able at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=51173. The M&A Rules were
revised in 2006 and 2009, respectively.
11 See Legislation Law of China, Arts. 79 and 83.
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undertaking that commits abusive tying may incur, among other things, a fine of up
to ten percent of its turnover in the preceding financial year (AML, Arts. 46 and 47),
while under the Price Law, a price cartel may incur a fine of up to five times the illegal
gains (Price Law, Art. 40); and under the AUCL, tying is prohibited irrespective of the
business operator’s market position, but the wrongdoer is only subject to civil damages
to the injured business operator (AUCL, Art. 20).
Another example is bid rigging. Although not explicitly prohibited under the AML,
bid rigging, as a type of hardcore cartel, could be caught under Article 13 (6) of AML,
and the wrongdoer could be fined up to ten percent of its turnover in the preceding
financial year.12 However, bid rigging is also prohibited under the AUCL and the Bid-
ding Law and can be prosecuted under the Criminal Law, where conviction could lead
to fines and up to 3 years’ imprisonment. Enforcement against bid rigging has resulted
in particularly strong sanctions.13 In this area, as in other areas of overlap, regulators
have a choice as to the law or set of laws that they apply.
Accordingly, the AML cannot be considered in isolation from preceding laws, some
of which, if applied, go beyond the generally accepted principles of competition law
with its emphasis on the protection of competition, not competitors.
Finally, price control laws remain. Although they are not usually regarded as part
of competition law, they have a relationship. A price law may affect competition—a
ceiling on monopoly prices may deter entry or, in the case of oligopoly, facilitate col-
lusion—or in other cases may replace the application of competition law. Currently,
there are signs of a rise in inflation in China, and this may generate greater recourse
to price regulation with possible side-effects on market functioning and competition.
5 General Features of the Antimonopoly Law
In May 1994, the AML was formally placed on the legislative agenda, and the govern-
ment formed a group to draft an antimonopoly law. The group was drawn principally
from the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and the SAIC. The first
complete draft of a law appeared in November 1999. This draft included most of
the features of the AML that took effect in August 2008. Many issues—including the
design of the enforcement mechanism, the treatment of cartels and takeovers by foreign
enterprises, the issue of administrative monopoly, and the policy towards SOEs—were
heavily debated during the legislative process.
Before we consider the details of the AML, some of its general features may be
noted. The AML is essentially similar to standard best-practice competition laws:
12 Article 13(6) of the AML is a sweeping provision that prohibits “other monopoly agreements as deter-
mined by the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies”.
13 For example, two officials who were convicted of bid rigging and bribery in 2004, in connection
with reorganising state enterprises, were sentenced to prison for 13 years; see China News, ‘Two Offi-
cials of Shanxi Yuncheng Sentenced to 13 years imprisonment’, available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/
2004-06-19/18352852259s.shtml (in Chinese). Enforcement against other kinds of price fixing agreements
has not been as vigorous so far. The fate of a short-lived “price alliance” among nine TV manufacturers
shows the beginning of stronger policy response; see Wang, 2002, p. 208. In the past, official calls for
“self-discipline” in pricing sometimes led to market results that were the equivalent of collusion.
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Its general prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and anti-
competitive mergers are in language that is similar to that of most OECD countries.
The flavour of the law is broadly European and especially Germanic rather than North
American.
The scope of the AML is comprehensive in that it covers the entire economy,
although there are provisions for exclusions and exemptions that are similar to those
in most OECD countries, though more expansive in tone, as is discussed later. The
AML also establishes legal processes, administrative procedures, and sanctions. Whilst
the Chinese have generally sought to adopt world best practice, it is also clear that
the AML has “Chinese characteristics”; this is a point that has been proclaimed by
Chinese authorities and is discussed below.
A somewhat unusual feature of the AML is its prohibition on the abuse of adminis-
trative powers to eliminate or restrict competition. This is unusual as most competition
statutes are restricted to anticompetitive behaviour by businesses.
Similar to the basic provisions of the US and EU competition laws, the AML
is expressed in broad language. In addition, it is customary for Chinese laws to be
expressed in a general manner. It appears that at some points the AML deliberately
incorporates ambiguous language to leave space for discretion and future development
and seemingly accommodates unresolved policy questions.
It is intended that the AML will be delineated by guidelines, regulations, and rul-
ings. Therefore, to understand it one needs to look at the guidelines that accompany
it as well as specific decisions. A number of guidelines have already been published
and are discussed in Sect. 7.
5.1 Objectives and General Principles
Chapter I of the AML sets out the objectives and general principles. Of particular
importance to the understanding of the objectives of the law is Article 1 about the pur-
pose of the law and Article 4 about the basis of the establishment and implementation
of the competition rules.
Article 1 states that:
This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic
conduct, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic effi-
ciency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest, and
promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.
Article 4 states that:
The State constitutes and implements competition rules which accord with the
socialist market economy, perfects macroeconomic regulation and control, and
advances a unified, open, competitive and orderly market system.
During the drafting process there was considerable repositioning and fine tuning of
the wording, which reflected tensions and disagreements about the goals of the law.
Earlier drafts of the law placed somewhat stronger emphases on goals such as the
healthy development of the socialist market economy; but in the final version this was
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included only as the last of the objectives, though clearly it remains of vital impor-
tance. Moreover, unlike some earlier drafts, the final draft includes reference to the
improvement of efficiency, thereby to that extent bringing the Law into line with most
economics-based competition law approaches around the world.
A number of policy goals are involved in these articles. China has never had a com-
mitment to the adoption of a full scale capitalist economy with private ownership of
production assets. In this context the inclusion of the goal of “promoting the healthy
development of the socialist market economy” in Article 1 and the reference to the
“socialist market economy” in Article 4 underlines that there is a qualified adoption
of the more conventional Western goals of competition, efficiency, and fairness. This
introduces a significant degree of conflict and ambiguity into the underlying principles
of the law and leaves room for the avoidance of the application of commonly accepted
competition principles, especially with respect to the treatment of SOEs and adminis-
trative monopoly, which are two of the most important areas with which competition
policy in China must engage.
There is also an indication of a national interest in the development of large Chinese
businesses in Article 5, which provides that:
Undertakings may, through fair competition, and voluntary alliance, concen-
trate themselves according to law, expand the scope of business operations, and
enhance competitiveness.
Article 5 can be read in various ways: It is perhaps simply an acknowledgement that,
as in any economy, business concentration, including mergers and acquisitions, can
occur. It could also be taken, however, as a signal that the AML merger control rules
will not be applied too strictly, especially to pure domestic transactions or transactions
that are initiated by national champions. In this context, it is also noteworthy that a
report that was issued by the SAIC in 2004 called for a stronger competition law to pro-
tect against anti-competitive strategies of large foreign firms.14 If the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority takes the position that foreign firms present particularly serious
threats to competition, then foreign firms may face closer enforcement scrutiny.15
5.2 Limits of the AML
5.2.1 Special treatment for SOEs
Article 7 of the AML provides that the state shall protect the legitimate operating
activities of industries that are dominated by the “state-owned economy” which are
14 See Fair Trading Office of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, ‘Anti-competitive
Behaviour of Multinational Companies in China and the Counter Measures’. For the Chinese version see
Journal of Administration of Industry and Commerce, 2005, May Issue.
15 For many years international competition meetings and conferences have been dominated by calls for
the adoption of competition law in all countries. Although there have been many reasons for these calls, one
reason seems to have been the idea that foreign investment would be better protected in the presence of a
competition law. The reverse notion—that the law might potentially be applied to restrict foreign enterprises
and create opportunities for local firms—has less often been acknowledged.
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vital to the Chinese national economy or national security or both and of those under-
takings with statutory rights of exclusive operation or sales. Article 7 further provides
that the state will supervise and control these undertakings’ operations and prices in
order to protect the interests of consumers and to promote technological progress. In
addition, these undertakings are required to operate in good faith and in accordance
with the law, and to accept public supervision, and are prohibited from using their
exclusive or controlling positions to harm consumers.
Article 7 is deemed as a compromise between competition law and industrial policy,
and there are three possible interpretations: One is that there is a virtually complete
exemption for SOEs. At the other extreme, there is full application to SOEs. An inter-
mediate position is that the law applies to SOEs in most respects; but where there
are explicit state-required operating activities that could run foul of the application
of competition law they are protected. Such circumstances sometimes arise in OECD
economies, where a utility is required to comply with competition law but not to the
extent that it cannot implement statutory or other government requirements that could
conflict with these laws (e.g. pricing that provides subsidies to particular classes of cus-
tomer). An interesting example of such a case could arise if an SOE defended an abuse
of dominance charge on the grounds that it was necessary to retain dominant status in
order to meet social obligations such as providing a loss-making cross-subsidy.
The treatment of SOEs does not differ as much from what is observed in OECD
economies as may first appear. In many such economies there has been a history of
state-owned (or sometimes privately owned) vertically integrated monopolies in the
area of public utilities (e.g., energy, communications, transport). The application of
competition law in these areas is quite limited. A pure monopolist has no competitors
to collude or merge with, nor to exercise dominance against. To introduce competi-
tion, what is needed is a set of steps beyond the scope of competition law—such as
the removal of entry, trade and investment barriers; the promotion of interregional
and international competition; horizontal and vertical disaggregation; “essential facil-
ities” laws; and competitive neutrality laws—and only after that does competition law
become relevant, usually highly relevant.
5.2.2 AML Exclusion for the Agricultural Sector
The only sectoral exclusion from the AML involves agriculture. The AML provides
a statutory exclusion for agricultural producers by declaring that it will not apply
to alliances or concerted actions among agricultural producers and rural economic
organizations in operational activities such as the production, processing, sales, trans-
portation, and storage of agricultural products (AML, Art. 56). This is not uncommon
in OECD countries.
5.3 AML and Intellectual Property Law
The AML stipulates that it does not apply to the conduct of undertakings in exercising
their intellectual property rights in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
However, conduct of undertakings to eliminate or restrict competition by abusing their
123
16 A. Fels
intellectual property rights shall be governed by the AML (Art. 55). The AML does
not clarify which types of behaviour would be construed as an abuse of intellectual
property rights. It is understood that the SAIC is drafting the guidelines on the inter-
face between the AML and intellectual property rights and will issue the guidelines
at some future date.
6 Main Rules of the AML
The AML covers four principal areas: anticompetitive agreements, abuse of domi-
nance, anticompetitive mergers, and administrative monopoly. The AML applies to
“undertakings”, which are defined as “natural persons, legal persons or any other
organizations that engage in the manufacture of or trading in goods, or the provision
of services” (AML, Art. 12). Through the prohibition on administrative monopoly,
the AML also applies to “administrative organs and other organizations administer-
ing public affairs in accordance with the law” (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“public authorities”) that abuse their administrative powers to eliminate or restrict
competition.
Article 2 of the AML relies on the effects doctrine as a basis to assert jurisdiction
over anticompetitive conduct that occur outside of China. Conduct that “has elimina-
tive or restrictive effects” on competition in the Chinese domestic market may trigger
the application of the AML. A textual reading of the AML does not require directness,
substantiality, or foreseeability as conditions, similar to those required by US and EU
competition law, to apply the law extraterritorially, but this may emerge as case law
develops over time. Irrespective of this, the worldwide reach of the Chinese economy,
and the extensive involvement, directly and indirectly, of most of the world’s largest
corporations, means that China is already an important entity in global competition
law enforcement and is likely to be of comparable importance to the EU, US, and
Japan within a few years.
6.1 Monopoly Agreements
Chapter 2 of the AML prohibits a range of horizontal and vertical anticompetitive
agreements, which are termed “monopoly agreements” and defined as “agreements,
decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition” (AML,
Arts. 13–16).
6.1.1 Horizontal Agreements
Article 13 of the AML provides a non-exclusive list of prohibited horizontal monopoly
agreements, according to which competing undertakings are prohibited from agree-
ments on price fixing, output restriction, market sharing, restrictions on products or
technology developments, and boycotts. The prohibition on restrictions on the pur-
chase of new technology or equipment seems to be a reflection of another agenda:
Chinese concern about technology transfer being restricted by agreements. Article 13
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also provides a sweeping clause to prohibit other horizontal monopoly agreements as
determined by the enforcement agencies.
Article 13 does not make clear whether any or all of the agreements are prohibited
per se. There is no substantiality element in the test, so that the law covers all agree-
ments, even if of minimal effect. Moreover, as discussed below, Article 15 provides
for a wide range of exemptions. All of this awaits the development of published case
law, of which there is still relatively little.
Article 16 makes explicit that trade associations are covered by the provisions. Such
coverage is probably implicit in the general prohibition that is contained in Article
13; but Article 16 was added to the AML at a late stage in its drafting, because of
a prominent case of price-fixing that was organized through a trade association just
before the enactment of the AML.16 Article 16 may also have been included in view
of the fact that many trade associations in China are government-run or -inspired and
that coverage needed to be indicated unequivocally.
6.1.2 Vertical Agreements
Article 14 of the AML specifically prohibits two types of vertical agreements: fixing
resale prices and setting minimum resale prices. Article 14 also includes a sweep-
ing clause that prohibits undertakings from making other vertical arrangements as
determined by the enforcement agencies. How the AML applies to recommended and
maximum prices, territorial and customer restrictions, exclusive distribution and sup-
ply, franchising, and other vertical arrangements is unclear at present and is expected
to be determined by the course of secondary rulemaking and enforcement practice.
6.1.3 Exemptions from the Application of the AML
The AML establishes an exemption mechanism that stipulates that the prohibition
on horizontal and vertical monopoly agreements shall not apply if the undertakings
involved can prove that the agreements are for the purpose of (1) improving tech-
nology, or researching and developing new products; (2) upgrading product quality,
reducing cost, enhancing efficiency, unifying specifications and standards of products,
or implementing a division of labour that is based on specialization; (3) improving
operational efficiency and enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized
undertakings; (4) realizing social public interests such as energy conservation, envi-
ronmental protection, and disaster relief; (5) during a period of economic depression,
moderating serious sales decreases or production surpluses; (6) safeguarding the legit-
imate interests of foreign trade and economic cooperation; or (7) other circumstances
as stipulated by law and by the State Council.
For an exemption from the application of Articles 13 and 14 based on the first five
grounds, the undertakings must additionally prove that the agreement can enable con-
sumers to share the interests that are derived from the agreement and will not severely
restrict competition in the relevant market. The first four grounds for exemption could
16 See NDRC Notice of the Investigation on Price Collusions between Instant Noodle Producers 2007,
Chinese version available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwtt/t20070816_154071.htm.
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be broadly regarded as efficiency or public interest related. The fifth ground relates
to a recession cartel. The exemption concerning foreign trade and foreign economic
cooperation includes but is wider than the customary export cartel exemptions that
can be found in OECD countries
The reference to the fact that the first five exemptions only apply if they are not
associated with a substantial reduction in competition and that consumers will share
the benefits from the agreement, may conceivably narrow the scope of the exemptions.
Article 15 puts the burden on the enterprises to demonstrate that the agreement meets
the exemption criteria but does not indicate who will make the decision. The AML does
not specify a mechanism for undertakings to seek a monopoly agreement exemption,
nor indicate whether the exemption must be obtained in advance or can be invoked as
a defence ex post. Early drafts of the AML provided a notification mechanism, which
was finally abandoned.
Clearly, however, the potential for exemption appears to be wide. It is too early to
draw lessons from experience. The trend in OECD countries has been for a progressive
narrowing of the opportunity for such exemptions to be relied upon. This narrowing
has been the product of the development of an ever-stronger pro-competition culture in
those countries. In the case of China the extent to which these exemptions are invoked
will also be related to the degree to which a competition culture emerges.
6.2 Abuse of Dominance
The AML prohibits firms with a dominant position from abusing that position to elim-
inate or restrict competition (AML, Art. 6). Chapter 3 on abuse of dominance begins
by non-exhaustively listing six types of abuse that are specifically prohibited. These
include unfair pricing (selling or buying goods at unfairly high or low prices), below-
cost sales, refusals to deal, exclusive or designated dealing, tying or imposing other
unreasonable transactional terms, and discriminatory dealing. Other abusive behav-
iour by dominant undertakings that is determined by the enforcement authorities is
also prohibited.17 With the exception of unfair pricing, the behaviour must be without
justification in order to be abusive.
6.2.1 Finding of a Dominant Position
The term “dominant market position” refers to a market position that is held by under-
takings that can control the price or volume of products or other trading conditions
in the relevant market, or can block or affect the entry of other undertakings into the
relevant market (AML, Art. 17). The AML provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
for assessing whether an undertaking holds a dominant market position, including:
(1) the market share of the undertaking and competitive circumstances in the relevant
market; (2) the ability of the undertaking to control the upstream or downstream mar-
ket; (3) the financial status or technical resources of the undertaking; (4) the extent
of dependence on the undertaking by other undertakings; (5) the degree of difficulty
17 See Article 17 of the AML.
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for other undertakings to enter the relevant market; and (6) any other factors that are
relevant to determining whether the undertaking holds a dominant market position
(AML, Art. 18).
The AML contains three presumptions of the market dominant position of under-
takings, which are based entirely on the market share thresholds. It provides that the
undertakings can be considered to have a dominant market position if any of the fol-
lowing conditions is fulfilled: (1) the market share of one undertaking is fifty percent
or more; (2) the combined market share of two undertakings accounts for two-thirds or
more; (3) the combined market share of three undertakings accounts for three-fourths
or more. If the combined undertakings fall under conditions (2) or (3), any undertak-
ing that has a market share of less than ten percent shall not be considered to hold
a dominant market position. These presumptions are rebuttable. For example, if the
undertaking can demonstrate that the relevant market remains substantially competi-
tive, or the undertaking under consideration has no dominant position in relation to the
remaining competitors, such undertaking should not be deemed to have a dominant
position (AML, Art. 19).
6.2.2 Justifications of Abuse of Dominance
Under the AML, a number of behaviour, if conducted “without justification”, may con-
stitute abuse of dominance and are prohibited. These include below-cost sales, refusal
to deal, tying and imposing other unreasonable terms, discriminatory treatment, and
other abusive behaviour as determined by the enforcement agencies (AML, Art. 17).
This means that justifications can be offered as a potential defense against an allega-
tion of abuse of dominance under the AML and the enforcement agencies will assess
the behaviour’s net effect on competition, instead of applying the prohibitions rigidly.
The AML does not clarify what would be construed as acceptable justifications, but
the AML-implementing regulations, as discussed in Sect. 7 below, are expected to fill
in some of the gaps.
6.3 Concentration of Undertakings
The AML adopts a general regime for applying competition policy to mergers and
acquisitions. Under the AML, the concept of “concentrations of undertakings” refers
to a variety of circumstances, including (1) mergers, (2) acquisitions of control of
other undertakings through purchasing shares or assets, and (3) acquisitions of con-
trol of other undertakings, or of the ability to exercise decisive influence over other
undertakings, through contract or other means (AML, Art. 20).
6.3.1 Substantive Test
Under the AML, a concentration may be prohibited if it has or is likely to have the
effect of eliminating or restricting competition, unless the parties can prove that the
concentration will lead to improvements in competition that significantly outweigh
its adverse affects on competition, or that the concentration is otherwise in the public
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interest. In the review of concentrations, MOFCOM is required to take into account
the following factors: (1) the market shares of the undertakings involved in the rele-
vant market and their ability to control the market; (2) the degree of concentration in
the relevant market; (3) the effects of the concentration on market entry and technol-
ogy development; (4) the effects of the concentration on consumers and other related
undertakings; (5) the effects of the concentration on national economic development;
and (6) other factors that may have an effect on market competition (AML, Art. 27).
Thus, the AML merger control regime will consider the claimed efficiencies and
is not tied to the restriction of competition test. However, the reference to public
interest and the effects of the concentration on national economic development may
encourage MOFCOM to approve or prohibit transactions, based on industrial policy
considerations. Once again, much will depend on general attitudes to competition
by regulatory bodies, courts and the government behind them. If a strong culture of
competition develops, the competition criteria will emerge as the most important.
6.3.2 Notification Thresholds and Review Procedures
Pursuant to the AML, the State Council promulgated the Rules on Notification Thresh-
olds for Concentrations of Undertakings (hereinafter “Thresholds Rules”) in August
2008. Under the AML, a notifiable concentration may not be implemented without a
prior notification. With a preliminary review following the notification, MOFCOM,
within thirty days, may either make a decision to open a further review investigation
or make a decision that no further investigation will be conducted. If MOFCOM fails
to reach a decision within the thirty-day time limit, the proposed concentration is
deemed to be cleared (AML, Art. 25). The time limit for the further review is ninety
days, which can be extended by up to another sixty days in specified circumstances and
with MOFCOM’s written notice to the undertakings involved. These circumstances
include (1) the undertakings involved agree to extend the time limit; (2) documents
submitted by the undertakings involved are inaccurate or need further verification; or
(3) the relevant circumstances have significantly changed following the notification
(AML, Art. 26).
6.3.3 Additional Reviews on Foreign Takeovers
As discussed above, the “effects doctrine” is incorporated into the AML. Most provi-
sions of the AML apply equally to domestic and foreign firms. The exception is that,
under the AML, acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors, and other
forms of concentration involving foreign investors that concern national security, are
subject to both a competition review and a national security review “in accordance
to the relevant provisions of the State”. 18 It should be noted that the M&A Rules
18 Article 31 of the AML states:
Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic enterprise or participates in concentration
by other means, if state security is involved, besides the examination on the concentration in accor-
dance with this Law, the examination on national security shall also be conducted in accordance
with the relevant State provisions.
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already contained a national security review, under which a foreign takeover required
an application to MOFCOM if the foreign firm intended to take control of a domestic
enterprise that is in a key industry or that has significant Chinese brands, or if the trans-
action could have an impact on national economic security. The fact that MOFCOM
is probably responsible for both merger control and national security review gives
rise to concerns that this may compromise its competition assessment of a proposed
transaction. The best practice is to separate the assessments.
On 3 February 2011, the General Office of the State Council promulgated the Cir-
cular on Establishing a Mechanism of Security Review of Mergers and Acquisitions of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (hereinafter “Circular on National Security
Review”), which took effect on 6 March 2011.19 The Circular on National Security
Review sets out the scope, content, review mechanism, and procedures of the national
security review. An Inter-Ministerial Joint Committee is established under the State
Council to be responsible for the national security review, and is led by the NDRC
and MOFCOM.20 The Circular on National Security Review establishes China’s first
formal process for evaluating national security issues that arise from foreign takeovers
and clarifies how Article 31 of the AML will be applied. Following the issue of the
Circular on National Security Review, MOFCOM stated that the Department of For-
eign Investment Administration under MOFCOM has been drafting operational rules
and procedures to increase the effectiveness and transparency of the national security
review system.21
6.4 Administrative Monopoly
The AML deals extensively with government restrictions on competition. By con-
trast, similar restrictions on competition especially on interstate or intra-community
competition are normally handled in other countries by meta laws, constitutional and
treaty provisions, or internal market policies, which are backed by major political
support and strong enforcement. The strong political support derives most often from
the fact that such laws were a critical part of the establishment of a new nation (e.g.
the foundation of the US and Australia) or the European Community.
Article 8 of the AML generally prohibits the abuse of administrative powers by pub-
lic authorities (including administrative agencies and organizations that are empow-
ered by laws or regulations for public affairs administration) to eliminate or restrict
competition; this is a type of behaviour that is widely referred to as “administrative
monopoly” (AML, Art. 8). Chapter 5 of the AML specifically prohibits public author-
ities from designated transactions, hindering free movement of goods among regions,
restricting non-local undertakings’ bidding activities in local markets, restricting non-
19 Official Chinese text of the Circular on National Security Review is available at: http://www.gov.cn/
zwgk/2011-02/12/content_1802467.htm; English translation is available at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/
FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=130963.
20 See Circular on National Security Review, Sec. III.




local undertakings’ investment and establishment of subsidiaries in local markets,
forcing undertakings to engage in prohibited monopoly conduct, and promulgating
anti-competitive rules (AML, Arts. 32–37). The AML does not provide a sweeping
clause to deal with other types of administrative monopoly, but the general prohibition
against administrative monopoly that is set out in Article 8 may provide a legal basis
for action.
Administrative monopoly is a substantial phenomenon in China. To protect strug-
gling local enterprises and preserve jobs, many local governments have established
trade barriers such as local customs posts and have supported exclusionary tactics
ranging from price predation to obstructing transport. Overt barriers and exclusive
dealing rules have been prohibited by the AUCL since 1993, and SAIC has had some
success in correcting these “regional blockades”.22
But anti-competitive regional protectionism can take more subtle forms. Measures
such as discrimination in taxes, standards, inspections, and licensing also create sig-
nificant barriers to commerce and competition. Local governments have sometimes
blocked mergers that would eliminate the separate identity of local firms or prevented
firms from exiting unproductive businesses through bankruptcy or merger. By inter-
fering with restructuring in order to protect local business interests, local governments
undermine the efficiency-promoting goals of reducing excess capacity and realising
economies of scale. The general prohibition in the AML and the detailed listing of
prohibited practices will extend enforcement oversight to indirect, complex abuses
and barriers.
However, the administrative monopoly provisions of the AML are relatively weak
and represent a compromise. The remedy against administrative monopoly is admin-
istrative. The enforcement agencies have no authority to enforce the administrative
monopoly provisions but only have powers to point out the problem to the superior
agency of the perpetrator and make proposals. Furthermore, the AML does not provide
a specific penalty on administrative monopoly although “discipline” is mentioned. The
administrative correction called for by the AML is similar to what is already provided
in the AUCL, except that the AUCL does not authorise the enforcement authority to
recommend action by the offender’s superior body. There is thus concern about a lack
of uniformity and dilution of message. A more significant problem may be the delega-
tion of enforcement to local levels. Local enforcers are employees of the government
that is engaging in the abuse.
In this light, the role of the anti-monopoly enforcement authorities under the AML
verges on advocacy. For example, Article 37 prohibits regulations that eliminate or
restrict competition, and thus it explicitly authorises the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority to raise concerns about regulations that interfere with competition more than
is necessary to achieve their other, presumably legitimate purposes. Correction and
discipline by the administrative superior body, as provided by the AUCL and AML,
may be the strongest power that would be clearly consistent with the current organising
22 The term “regional blockades” is widely used in China to refer to trade barriers that have been imposed
by local governments, such as setting up checkpoints at regional borders to obstruct the transport of goods
produced in other regions. As a typical form of local protectionism, regional blockades divide the national
market into many narrow local markets; see (Wang, 2002, p. 211).
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principles of China’s government bodies. Authorising the anti-monopoly enforcement
authorities to initiate the inquiry and recommend action gives them a positive role. The
power to make the recommendation public could be important to making the process
effective.
Government restrictions on competition are important in all economies, and are
usually at least as important as the business restrictions brought about by cartels,
anticompetitive mergers, and abuse of dominance. China is no exception. There is,
however, an additional overlay: In North America, Europe, and Australia restrictions
on regional competition are usually outlawed by constitutional or treaty provisions,
which are themselves key laws that have been established for the fundamental pur-
poses of nation or community building and strictly enforced by the highest courts in
the law.
China has no such meta laws, nor even a strong tradition of eliminating such restric-
tions. Many factors contribute to the importance of these restrictions: China’s large
size; a history, in Maoist times, of decentralising the development of industry in the
interests of defence policy; the high dependence for revenue by sub-national govern-
ments on monopolies that emerge from protected local enterprises; and local protec-
tionism generally.
There are conceptual and practical difficulties in governments’ legislating to outlaw
their own anticompetitive laws and practices, and even those of government at lower
levels. Nevertheless the issue was recognised as too important to be omitted from
the scope of the AML. Accordingly the compromise has been to outlaw the abuse of
administrative monopoly but to rely essentially on administrative processes to resolve
the matters. Thus far, abuse of administrative monopoly appears not to have been
accorded very high priority in the application of the AML, and instead the emphasis
has been on the application of the conventional elements of the law.
6.5 Enforcement Mechanism
6.5.1 Multiple Enforcement Agencies
As discussed above, before the AML took effect, China dealt with competition-related
issues through a series of laws, regulations, rules, and policies. The NDRC, the SAIC,
and MOFCOM had played separate, but sometimes overlapping, roles in regulating
competition. The three agencies’ authority was primarily established by the AUCL,
the Price Law, and the M&A Rules.
The AML does not improve the multi-agency mechanism, and the enforcement
power of the AML is still divided between the three agencies. The NDRC is respon-
sible for the prohibition of price-related monopoly agreements, abusive conduct by
dominant undertakings, and administrative monopoly. The SAIC is responsible for the
prohibition of non-price-related monopoly agreements, abusive conduct by dominant
firms, and administrative monopoly. MOFCOM is responsible for merger control.
The AML provides that the enforcement agencies, based on their needs, may autho-
rize their corresponding organs at the provincial level to be in charge of the anti-
monopoly enforcement work (AML, Art. 10, para. 2). In light of the division of AML
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enforcement power, an Antimonopoly Commission (AMC) was established under the
State Council as a high-level agency to organize, coordinate, and guide anti-monopoly
enforcement work. So far it has not been very visible.
The AML lacks an independent enforcement agency with sufficient authority
because none of the three agencies that enforce the AML is structurally indepen-
dent from the government. Under the current enforcement mechanism, transparency
of rule-making and of reasons for decisions is of particular importance, as this will
show that decisions are based on vigorous competition analysis rather than on bargains
among interests. In addition, unless there is close coordination the divided authorities
among the three agencies have the potential to create gaps and overlaps, inconsisten-
cies, inefficiencies and inter-agency frictions.
Coordination between agencies will be one of the key challenges to the coherent
enforcement of the AML. A simple example would arise where an abuse of dominance
involves a mixture of price-related and non-price related elements. However, it should
be noted that the existence of more than one enforcement agency, not to mention pri-
vate enforcement rights, and the existence of layers of agencies at different levels of
government, is hardly unknown in OECD countries and has not created unworkable
situations.23
6.5.2 Sanctions and the Role of the Courts
Under the AML, the enforcement agencies may impose cease and desist orders, con-
fiscate the illegal gains, and/or impose fines of between one and ten per cent of an
undertaking’s annual turnover in the preceding year for an infringement of the AML
rules on monopoly agreements or abuse of dominance (AML, Arts. 46 and 47). In a
case where the monopoly agreement has not been implemented, a fine of up to RMB
500,000 (approximately US$78,000) may be imposed. Implementing an anti-compet-
itive concentration in violation of the AML merger control rules is liable to a fine of
up to RMB 500,000 (US$78,000) (AML, Art. 48).
The people’s courts have the power to review enforcement actions that are taken
pursuant to the AML (AML, Art. 53 and 50). In addition, Article 50 of the AML enti-
tles individuals and entities to bring private actions to the people’s courts, that would
challenge monopoly conduct in violation of the AML and claim damages.
The modern Chinese Law is based on the civil law system and is derived from
continental legal principles. In contemporary China, the legislature retains power to
interpret laws, and the Chinese Constitution is ambiguous about the scope and nature
of judicial review of legislation. In addition, the Communist Party of China (CPC) still
23 When the United States expressed concerns about the multiple Chinese enforcement agencies, the con-
cern was noted by the China authorities who, however, drew attention to the existence of two federal
antitrust agencies (the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission),
along with several other national agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Department of Transportation, all of
which play a role in competition law broadly defined. As well, it was noted that some 37 states play a role in
enforcing US antitrust law, along with several hundred million citizens with private enforcement rights. The
concerns of the European Union, with its numerous member state agencies, were also noted and received
a similar response.
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exercises authority over the judiciary. An instrumentalist and pragmatic view toward
the role of the law is prevailing.
7 Latest Development of the AML: Rule Makings And Enforcement Records
7.1 The AML-Implementing Regulations
The AML contains the objectives and principles, and establishes a general frame-
work of competition law in China. Over 3 years after the commencement of the AML,
a series of AML-implementing regulations have been issued or are under consid-
eration. Most implementing regulations have been published for comments before
enactment, and the enforcement agencies have embraced opinions from foreign and
domestic interested parties.
The NDRC, as the agency enforcing the AML rules on price-related monopoly
agreements, abuse of dominance and administrative monopoly, has issued the Mea-
sures on the Prohibition of Price Monopoly and the Measures on the Administrative
Enforcement Procedures of the Prohibition of Price Monopoly. 24 The SAIC, as the
agency that enforces the AML rules on non-price-related monopoly agreements, abuse
of dominance, and administrative monopoly, has issued the Measures on Procedures
for Investigating and Handling Cases of Monopoly Agreements and Abuse of Market
Dominance, the Measures on Procedures for the Prohibition of Abuse of Administra-
tive Powers to Eliminate or Restrict Competition, the Measures on the Prohibition of
Monopoly Agreements, the Measures on the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market
Position, and the Measures on the Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Powers to
Eliminate or Restrict Competition.25
In the merger control area, the State Council has issued the Rules on Notification
Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings, and MOFCOM has issued the Mea-
sures on the Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings and the Measures on the
Review of Concentrations of Undertakings.26 In addition, MOFCOM has issued a
series of other implementing regulations and guiding opinions to provide guidance to
interested parties on important issues such as notifiable matters, calculation of turnover
for merger notification purposes, procedures of divestiture, etc.
These implementing regulations are welcome and encouraging, as they delineate
the AML provisions, codify the enforcement agencies’ practices, and thus signifi-
cantly increase transparency and predictability. For example, as was discussed above,
the AML does not clarify what would be construed as acceptable “justifications”
for dominant undertakings’ otherwise prohibited behaviour. The AML-implementing
regulations are expected to fill in the gap. For example, the NDRC Measures on the
Prohibition of Price Monopoly clarify what would constitute acceptable justifications
24 Official Chinese text of these measures is available at http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/; English translation is
available by subscription at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
25 Official Chinese text of these measures is available at http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/; English trans-
lation is available by subscription at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
26 Official Chinese text of these measures is available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/c/c.html; English trans-
lation is available by subscription at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
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for a refusal to deal by way of imposing excessively high selling prices or low purchas-
ing prices, including (1) the counter parties have seriously bad credit records or their
operational conditions continue to deteriorate, which may cause significant risks to
transaction safety, (2) the counter parties are able to purchase the same or substitutable
goods from other sources at reasonable prices or to sell the goods to other undertakings
at reasonable prices, and (3) other reasons that can prove that the refusal is justified.27
7.2 Enforcement Cases28
Since the AML entered into force, MOFCOM has been an active enforcer of the merger
control law. From 1 August 2008 to 31 May 2011, MOFCOM has completed reviews
of 240 merger filings, of which 233 were cleared unconditionally, six were condition-
ally cleared, and one was prohibited.29 In early June 2011, MOFCOM published the
Uralkali/Silvinit decision, which was MOFCOM’s seventh conditional clearance to
date.30 Local bureaus of the NDRC in Guangxi province took the first official action
in early 2010 against a price cartel involving local rice noodle producers.31 In July
2010, the NDRC announced that its local bureaus had made three decisions in rela-
tion to price collusion in the markets for green beans and garlic and imposed fines
on a large number of domestic agricultural trading companies.32 A number of other
official enforcement actions pursuant to the AML have been undertaken by the SAIC
thus far.33
Clearly it is too early to generalise about enforcement. By far the most con-
troversial merger case occurred when MOFCOM issued its decision to prohibit
the proposed US$2.4 billion acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited
(Huiyuan) by The Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) on 18 March 2009 (the Coca-
Cola/Huiyuan decision).34 It should be noted, however, that the decision is not out
27 See NDRC Measures on the Prohibition of Price Monopoly, Art. 13.
28 For up-to-date information on the enforcement of the AML, see China Competition Bulletin, a monthly
publication that is edited by Fels et al. (2011) and is available at: http://www.anzsog.edu.au/research/
publications/the-china-competition-bulletin.
29 Information disclosed by Mr Shang Ming, Director General of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the MOF-
COM at the 7th International Symposium of Competition Law and Policy, held on 3 and 4 June 2011 in
Beijing. See China Competition Bulletin, Special Report, June 2011 at: http://www.anzsog.edu.au/content.
asp?pageId=261. The six conditional clearance decisions include the InBev/Anheuser Busch, Mitsubishi
Rayon/Lucite, Pfizer/Wyeth, GM/Delphi, Sanyo/Panasonic, and Novartis/Alcon decisions; and the prohi-
bition decision involves the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan transaction. Official Chinese text of these decisions is
available at: http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/ztxx/ztxx.html.
30 Official text of the Uralkali/Silvinit decision is available at: http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/ztxx/ztxx.html.
31 An official report on the decision against the rice noodle cartel was published by the NDRC on 30 March
2010, available at: http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20100330_338105.htm (in Chinese).
32 An official announcement was published by the NDRC on 2 July 2010, available at: http://jjs.ndrc.gov.
cn/gzdt/t20100702_358457.htm (in Chinese).
33 Xinhua News Agency, ‘Trade Association Allocated Market Share; Jiangsu Completed the
First Anti-Monopoly Investigation’, available at: www.js.xinhua.org/xin_wen_zhong_xin/2011-01/21/
content_21923072.htm (in Chinese).
34 See MOFCOM announcement of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Decision; official Chinese text of the
decision available at: http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html (in Chinese).
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of line with international precedents. A proposed global merger of Coca-Cola and
Schweppes was opposed on similar grounds in many countries before being aban-
doned. In addition, Australia blocked a proposed Coca-Cola acquisition of the Berri
fruit juice company,35 which was a case that drew MOFCOM’s close attention during
its review of the Coco-Cola/Huiyuan deal.
Another important decision occurred on 13 August 2010, when MOFCOM
announced that it approved the proposed acquisition of Alcon by Novartis, which
were two global pharmaceutical companies that were headquartered in Switzerland.36
The decision was conditional upon Novartis’ commitments made with respect to oph-
thalmological pharmaceutical and contact lens care products in China. This decision
was also not without controversy. In both cases only relatively brief explanations of the
decisions were provided. However, it needs to be recognised that some lack of detail is
the norm in the early days of the operation of a new competition law in most countries,
especially in the area of merger law where there is pressure for quick decisions.
8 Conclusions
The AML embodies the key features of a modern competition law, with its prohibi-
tions on cartels, abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive mergers; adopts generally
accepted principles and standards of competition law (although leaving much room
for interpretation) and is accompanied by appropriate sanctions and administrative
arrangements. Somewhat unusually it also has prohibitions on the abuse of adminis-
trative monopoly.
Thus, whilst the AML embodies the standard elements of a modern competition
law, it is also true to say that it has “Chinese characteristics”. These especially recog-
nise that SOEs have a special role in the Chinese economy; that there is a desire not
to unduly inhibit the development of Chinese businesses; and that there are distinctive
challenges that arise from the widespread existence of administrative monopoly and
local protectionism. The “Chinese characteristics” also reflect unresolved policy con-
flicts between supporters of a conventional OECD-style competition law and policy
and the proponents of other approaches that are based on a greater role for SOEs and
for industrial policy considerations.
Footnote 34 continued
For further comments on the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Decision, see Lin and Zhao, Merger Controzl Policy under
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, in this volume.
35 For ACCC’s press release and competition analysis of the proposed CCA/Berri transaction, see http://
www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/486557/fromItemId/751043 and http://www.accc.gov.au/
content/index.phtml/itemId/407482/fromItemId/378016. The ACCC considered that the CCA could exert
its market power to link sales of the Berri fruit juice products to its dominant Coca-Cola soft drink product
and retailers would also have commercial incentives to bundle Berri’s fruit juice products with CCA’s lead-
ing portfolio of beverages. The ACCC’s investigation strongly suggested that the likely effect of the Berri
acquisition would be reduced consumer choice and, ultimately, higher prices for consumers.
36 MOFCOM announcement of the Novartis/Alcon Decision, official Chinese text of the decision available
at: http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201008/20100807080639.html (in Chinese). For further com-
ments on the Novartis/Alcon Decision, see Shan et al. China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare
Standard? in this volume.
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Competition law differs at least in degree from many other forms of the law, such as
contract or property law in that rather than being technical in nature its interpretation
and application cannot be easily separated from the particular policies and themes
that rule the day. These change over time in any economy. In the US, for example,
the history of competition law is that the initial approach of enforcement under the
Sherman Act with its populism and focus on big business was quite different from
the modern enforcement approach with its emphasis on economic efficiency. So the
underlying policy that drives the application of the law and influences its detailed
approach may differ from one country to another and may change considerably over
time. This is especially the case in China, with its profound differences in economic
policy and governance, as compared with OECD countries. Already it is apparent that
there is a degree of uncertainty, contradiction, ambiguity, and shifting objectives in
the policy background that reflects these tensions, and this adds to the complexity of
interpretation, application, and enforcement of the law.
Competition law differs also from many other areas of microeconomic policy. The
main need in many areas of microeconomic reform is to remove government restric-
tions on competition, whether they are import restrictions, domestic entry barriers, or
the like. There is very little administrative difficulty in doing this. Once the decision to
deregulate or liberalise has been made, the government normally merely has to sign a
piece of paper that gives effect to the decision, and there is little or nothing for it to do
after that: the market is simply left on its own to get to work in reallocating resources.
Competition law is different: Whilst its introduction can be triumphantly proclaimed
by governments, how it operates in practise is all-important. A vast amount of admin-
istrative, legal, economic, and political work is required. Institutions have to be estab-
lished, investigations initiated, analysis and decisions made, litigation conducted, and
enforcement applied. There are also major challenges in securing economy-wide com-
pliance; in undertaking educational and compliance programs; and in developing a
competition culture on the part of the community and business. Usually there are
major challenges from powerful interest groups and businesses.
The most important test of the Chinese competition law is not how well it is
designed, but how well it is being applied in practise. In this regard the challenge
of operating competition law in practise in China is huge, with its population of 1.3
billion, its five levels of government, and its geographical spread. Moreover, there
are major challenges both in building a culture that supports and enforces competition
law and in establishing institutional machinery that enables enlightened and consistent
effect to be given to them.
The AML has been in force for over 3 years. Information about the application and
enforcement is relatively scarce because of the small number of cases and limited
transparency, and it is still too early to reach many conclusions.
However, a discernible early feature has been the prominent role that has been
assigned to merger law. This is an area of much activity. This contrasts with many
countries that sidelined merger law in their early days of competition law enforcement.
The fact is, however, that merger law is a critical, integral part of competition law, and
there are major disadvantages in not adopting it from the start. Arguably merger law
is a great deal more important than any other part of competition law because it deals
with structural matters. Putting an end to cartels is useful, but if the industry structure is
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favourable to collusion then the economic effect of terminating illegal cartels may not
be very great because much the same price outcomes may still occur without unlawful
behaviour after the breakup.
A sound approach to mergers tends to inhibit the adoption of anticompetitive struc-
tures that facilitate collusion about prices. Moreover, in countries that initially attack
cartels and ignore mergers there is a tendency for members of those cartels to seek to
merge once they have been outlawed, generating much the same adverse affects on
consumers as the cartel did. Moreover, once a one-sided competition law is adopted it
tends to accelerate merger activity in anticipation of the adoption in the future of the
merger element of a competition law.
Another consequence of taking merger law seriously in the early days is that it
forces the competition regulator to make early decisions in the life of the competition
law. Without a merger regime a regulator may in its early years take a very long time
before it makes legally important decisions at all, and face further legal delays once it
acts.
As noted, superficially at least, merger law seems to be an area of great visible
activity in the competition law of China. One of the major experiences of competition
law is that in its early days some significant mistakes can be made. There are no signs
at this stage that China has made serious mistakes in the application of merger law
and the approach has been broadly sensible and reasonably timely in decision making,
especially considering that it is a new activity.
Finally there is a wider issue: the challenge to adopt and implement a comprehen-
sive national competition policy. A central element of a national competition policy
would be a system to review all laws and policies, including abuse of administrative
monopoly, that restrict competition and to locate and correct constraints on enterprise
activity that are more stringent than necessary to correct market failure or to achieve
other policy goals. This task has received little attention in China, although it is fair
to note that there has been equally little attention paid to the issue in most OECD
countries.
It is too early to draw many conclusions about the impact of the AML in these early
days of the application of the law. Whilst the challenges, especially of enforcement,
seem daunting, a start has been made in a journey of a thousand miles.
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